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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Maurice Ronald Troutman appeals from the judgment entered upon the 
jury verdict finding him guilty of rape, claiming his due process rights were 
violated as a result of unobjected to statements made by the prosecutor during 
her opening statement and closing argument. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedinas 
Heather S. and her friend "Jessi" came to Boise one weekend to watch an 
arena football game between the Bakersfield Blitz and the Boise Burn. (Trial Tr., 
p.60, L.2 - p.61, L.9, p.63, Ls.22-25.) Heather frequently traveled to Blitz games 
when they were in the area because she was friends with James Durant, one of 
the coaches for the Bakersfield team, and was dating Eric Coleman, who was 
also a coach for that team. (Trial Tr., p.61, Ls.5-9, p.64, Ls.8-17, p.156, Ls.3-6.) 
Heather and Jessi stayed at the Grove Hotel, where the team and coaches were 
also staying. (Trial Tr., p.62, Ls.13-19, p.65, Ls.8-9.) When Heather and Jessi 
checked in, they were given two room keys for Room 1020. (Trial Tr., p.65, L.24 
- p.66, L. l l . )  
At the game on Saturday night, Heather and Jessi had a beer. (Trial Tr., 
p.75, Ls.3-5.) After the game was over, Heather and Jessi returned to their room 
to get ready to go out. (Trial Tr., p.67, Ls.2-5.) However, they were unable to 
gain access to their room because Jessi's key, the only key the girls had with 
them, was no longer working, and Heather had left her key in the room. (Trial 
Tr., p.67, Ls.4-12.) The girls then went down to the front desk where the desk 
clerk provided them two new keys. (Trial Tr., p.67, L.6 - p.68, L.2.) 
After they returned to their room and got ready, Heather, Jessi, and four of 
the coaches, James, Eric, Gary Compton, and Mike Cooper, went out to a local 
bar, where Heather had a few more drinks. (Trial Tr., p.69, Ls.9-13, p.71, Ls.14- 
23, p.74, Ls.16-?8.) Steve Baker, a player for the Blitz, also joined them at the 
bar. (Trial Tr., p.70, Ls.12-21.) Heather, Jessi, and Steve left the bar sometime 
around 1:00 a.m. and returned to the hotel to Heather's and Jessi's room. (Trial 
Tr., p.72, L.15 - p.73, L.12, p.169, Ls.9-15.) Jessi and Steve eventually decided 
to go back to Steve's room. (Trial Tr., p.170, Ls.14-19.) After Jessi and Steve 
left, Heather took a sleeping pill, Ambien, and went to bed without changing her 
clothes. (Trial Tr., p.76, L.9 - p.78, L.24.) 
When Jessi and Steve got to Steve's room, there were several people in 
there, including a couple having sex. (Trial Tr., p.172, Ls.1-14.) Jessi felt 
uncomfortable so she and Steve went back to Jessi's room where Jessi changed 
clothes. (Trial Tr., p.172, L.14 - p.173, L.2.) Jessi and Steve left shortly 
thereafter, and Jessi left her room key and license behind. (Trial Tr., p.174, Ls.8- 
22.) Jessi and Steve went back to Steve's room where Jessi helped the girl who 
had been having sex gather her belongings and go downstairs to catch a cab 
because, Jessi explained, the girl "didn't seem altogether." (Trial Tr., p.175, Ls.4- 
15., p.177, Ls.18-19.) Jessi then returned to Steve's room and spent the night 
with him. (Trial Tr., p.178, L.13 - p.179, L.13.) 
The next morning, Jessi returned to her room where Heather had to let her 
in since Jessi had left her key behind the night before. (Trial Tr., p.80, L.24 - 
p.81, L.Z., p.179, Ls.10-18.) At that time, Heather realized something "wasn't 
right." (Trial Tr., p.81, L.3 - p.82, L.23.) Heather's pants were off, including her 
underwear, and laying on the floor. (Trial Tr., p.81, Ls.9-25.) Her bra was also 
off, and her shirt, which tied in the back, was untied. (Trial Tr., p.82, Ls.1-5.) 
Heather then started having vague memories of pushing someone's head away 
and someone flipping her over and entering her vagina from behind. (Trial Tr., 
p.83, L.16 - p.85, L.3, p.93, Ls.8-18.) Heather called Eric and told him 
something happened and "something was definitely not right." (Trial Tr., p.85, 
Ls.12-15.) Heather told Eric she thought she had sex the night before but was 
not sure if it was "consensual," and could not clearly remember what happened 
after she took her Ambien. (Trial Tr., p.256, Ls.7-12, 16-23.) Heather did not call 
law enforcement at that time. 
At some point, Heather also realized some of her things were missing, 
including her iPod, her iPod alarm, her camera, and $70.00 cash from her purse. 
(Trial Tr., p.86, L.18 - p.88, L.lO.) One of the room keys was also missing. 
(TrialTr., p.106, L.18-p.107, 1.1.) 
Jessi called Eric and told him about the apparent theft, at which time Eric 
went down to the front desk to tell them "some things" had been stolen from 
Heather's room. (Trial Tr., p.257, Ls.3-12, p.257, Ls.13-21.) Eric did not report a 
possible sexual assault because Heather was "so unsure of what had 
happened." (Trial Tr., p.258, Ls.15-18.) 
After law enforcement arrived at the Grove, Troutman approached Officer 
Cody Evans, who was in the hotel lobby, and told him "[a] little birdie in the tree" 
told him Heather had given someone her key to "come in to . . . hang out with 
her." (Trial Tr., p.329, L.25 - p.332, L.19; Exhibit 16A, p.1, Ls.8-9.) Troutman 
then asked Officer Evans if Heather was "missing something." (Exhibit 16A, p.2, 
Ls.14-15.) Officer Evans told Troutman Heather was missing an iPod and a 
camera. (Exhibit 16A, p.2, L.19.) Officer Evans also told Troutman Heather 
thought she had been raped, to which Troutman responded, "Fuck no." (Exhibit 
16A, p.3, Ls.5-7.) Officer Evans then told Troutman Heather's belongings had 
been returned to the front desk. (Exhibit 16A, p.3, Ls.15-16.) Troutman 
explained that was "because the word got out that it, something happened." 
(Exhibit 16A, p.3, Ls.17-19; see also Exhibit 17A, p.1, Ls.20-25.) Troutman 
elaborated on this later, telling Detective Matt Brechwald he "put the word out" to 
other players that if any of them stole Heather's property, they could return it 
outside his door and he would turn it in for them. (Trial Tr., p.454, Ls.7-12.) 
According to Troutman's initial statements, he purposely lefi his room to allow 
this to happen and returned to find a white bag leaning against his door with the 
stolen property inside. (Trial Tr., p.454, Ls.13-17.) Troutman then returned the 
bag to the front desk.' (Trial Tr., p.454, Ls.17-19.) 
' James Dennis, the front desk supervisor at the Grove Hotel testified that an 
African-American male brought a bag to the front desk and told him the "coach" 
would pick it up. (Trial Tr., p.319, L.12 - p.320, L.2.) Sometime later, Mr. Dennis 
received a call from an unidentified male who told him the items turned in were 
for Room 1020. (Trial Tr., p.320, L.24 - p.322, L.1.) 
After explaining his involvement with the stolen property, Troutman told 
Detective Brechwald he heard Heather said she was raped, and he wanted to 
"clear himself." (Trial Tr., p.454, Ls.20-25.) Troutman admitted he had sex with 
Heather after "the friend" allegedly gave him Heather's room key and told him to 
go "holler at her." (Exhibit 22A, p.12, Ls.8-11; Trial Tr., p.455, Ls.1-23.) 
Troutman took the key, let himself inio Heather's room, where she was sleeping, 
laid down next to her and "started cuddling with her." (Exhibit 22A, p.12, Ls.11- 
13; Trial Tr., p.455, L.24 - p.456, L.lO.) Troutman said she mumbled something 
incoherent at one point but they never had any conversation. (Trial Tr., p.456, 
Ls.10-12.) Troutman specifically admitted penetrating Heather from behind. 
(Trial Tr., p.458, Ls.12-16.) 
Troutman also admitted giving the key to Heather's room to another 
player, later identified as Rennard Reynolds, after he left and telling Reynolds he 
just had sex in there and Reynolds could probably get "laid" too. (Trial Tr. p.456, 
Ls.16-20.) According to Troutman, he thought Heather was one of those girls 
who likes to have sex with multiple football players. (Trial Tr., p.456, L.21 - 
p.457, L.2.) When the police confronted Troutman with information they heard 
from Reynolds that Troutman said he told Heather it was just a "dream," 
Troutman claimed he only told Reynolds that to find "how much of a big mouth 
[Reynolds] was." (Exhibit 22A, p.44, L . l l  - p.5, L.23.) 
With respect to the items stolen from Heather's room, Troutman admitted 
"grabb[ing] some stuff thinking it was [his] stuff," but said he "gave it back as 
soon as [he] found out it wasn't [his]." (Exhibit 22A, p.19, Ls.13-19.) Although 
Troutman did not identify what in particular he "grabbed," Leo Sullivan, a fellow 
player and Troutman's roommate on the trip, testified that Troutman told him he 
got a camera from "some girl." (Trial Tr., p.216, Ls.8-22.) 
Further investigation by law enforcement revealed there were a total of 
four unauthorized entries into Heather's room. (Exhibit 28; see generally Trial Tr. 
and Grand Jury Tr.) 
Heather underwent a sexual assault exam at which time swabs were 
taken of her face, breasts, rectum, and genitals for purposes of DNA testing. 
(Trial Tr., p.96, Ls.21-25, p.386, L.3 - p.387, L.1, p.388, Ls.2-18, p.395, Ls.6-18.) 
Rylene Nowlin, an expert in DNA comparison analysis, conducted DNA testing 
on the swabs taken from Heather and compared those results with the results of 
DNA testing on swabs taken from Troutman and ~e~nolds. '  (Trial Tr., p.503, 
Ls.18-22, p.510, L.22 - p.518, L.18.) As a result of this testing, Ms. Nowlin 
determined that Heather and Troutman were both "potential contributors" to the 
DNA found on Heather's vaginal swabs to the exclusion of "99.99 per cent of 
randomly-selected individuals." (Trial Tr., p.512, Ls.9-17.) Troutman was also 
the "source of semen" on the perineal swabs taken from Heather. (Trial Tr., 
p.514, Ls.20-21.) Ms. Nowlin also identified Reynolds as a potential contributor 
to the DNA evidence on the saliva swabs taken from Heather's face, and could 
Ms. Nowlin also compared Heather's swabs with swabs taken from Eric 
Coleman, Mike Cooper, and Steve Baker, all of whom were excluded as possible 
contributors to the DNA evidence found on Heather's swabs. (Trial Tr., p.513, 
Ls.12-15, p.518, Ls.12-18.) 
not eliminate Troutman as an additional source. (Trial Tr., p.516, L.10 - p.518, 
L.16.) 
Troutman was indicted for rape.3 (R., pp.11-12.) The indictment 
specifically alleged Troutman committed the crime of rape by "penetrat[ingj the 
vaginal opening of Heather S., . . ., with his penis, and where Heather S. was 
unconscious of the nature of the act at the time," or "was unable lo  resist due to 
any intoxicating or narcotic substance." (R. p.12.) Troutman's case proceeded 
to trial, and a jury convicted him of rape. (R., p.64.) The court imposed a unified 
twenty-year sentence with five years fixed. (R., p.73.) Troutman timely 
appealed. (R., pp.75-77.) 
The state also sought an indictment against Troutman for burglary based on his 
entry into Heather's room with the intent to commit rape, or in the alternative, with 
the intent to commit theft. (R., p.12.) The grand jury did not find probable cause 
to support this charge. (R., p.12.) 
Troutman states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the prosecutor engage in misconduct depriving Mr. Troutman of 
due process of law and a fair trial, such that he is now entitled to a 
new trial? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.7.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Troutman failed to show error, much less fundamental error, in relation to 
the prosecutor's opening statement or closing arguments? 
ARGUMENT 
Troutman Has Failed To Establish Error. Much Less Fundamental Error. In 
Relation To Any Of The Prosecutor's Comments Durinq Her Opening Statement 
Or Closina Arauments 
A. Introduction 
Troutman argues that the prosecutor made several comments during her 
opening statement and closing arguments, which he did not object to, that 
prejudiced his right to a fair trial. (Appellant's Brief, pp.8-26.) Troutman has 
failed to establish any basis for reversal, however, because he has failed to 
establish error, much less fundamental error, in relation to any of the prosecutor's 
statements. 
B. Standard Of Review And General Leaal Standards Governinq Claims Of 
Prosecutorial Misconduct 
A defendant is not entitled to relief based upon a claim of prosecutorial 
misconduct unless he can establish two things: (1) the complained of conduct 
was improper; and (2) the improper conduct prejudiced him. State v. Romero- 
Garcia, 139 Idaho 199, 202, 75 P.3d 1209, 1212 (Ct. App. 2003). Thus, a mere 
assertion or finding that a particular question or statement was objectionable or 
improper is insufficient to establish prosecutorial misconduct. As explained by 
the United States Supreme Court: "[llt is not enough that the prosecutors' 
remarks were undesirable or even universally condemned. The relevant 
question is whether the prosecutors' comments so infected the trial with 
unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process." Darden 
v. Wainwriaht, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (internal quotations and citations 
omitted); see also Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982) ("[Tlhe touchstone 
of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the 
fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.") In that regard, the 
Supreme Court has indicated prosecutorial misconduct may occur where the 
prosecutor "manipulate[s] or misstate[s] the evidence" or "implicate[s] other 
specific rights of the accused such as the right to counsel or the right to remain 
silent." Id. at 181-82. However, "a criminal conviction is not to be lightly 
overturned on the basis of a prosecutor's comments standing alone, for the 
statements or conduct must be viewed in context; only by so doing can it be 
determined whether the prosecutor's conduct affected the fairness of the trial." 
United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 11 (1985). Thus, the Court must consider 
the probable effect that the prosecutor's argument "would have on the jury's 
ability to judge the evidence fairly." Id. at 11-12. Consistent with Darden and 
m, the ldaho Supreme Court has held that a conviction will be set aside for 
prosecutorial misconduct only when the conduct is sufficiently egregious as to 
result in fundamental error. State v. Hairston, 133 ldaho 496, 507, 988 P.2d 
1170, 1181 (1999). 
With respect to prosecutorial misconduct in the context of closing 
argument the Supreme Court has stated: 
Isolated passages of a prosecutor's argument, billed in advance to 
the jury as a matter of opinion not of evidence, do not reach the 
same proportions. Such arguments, like all closing arguments of 
counsel, are seldom carefully constructed in toto before the event; 
improvisation frequently results in syntax left imperfect and 
meaning less than crystal clear. While these general observations 
in no way justify prosecutorial misconduct, they do suggest that a 
court should not lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an 
ambiguous remark to have its most damaging meaning or that a 
jury, sitting through lengthy exhortation, will draw that meaning from 
the plethora of less damaging interpretations. 
Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 646-47 (1974). 
The ldaho Supreme Court has recently reiterated the importance of 
reviewing closing arguments in light of their improvisational nature, noting that "in 
reviewing allegations of prosecutorial misconduct [the appellate court] must keep 
in mind the realities of trial." State v. Field, 144 ldaho 559, 571, 165 P.3d 273, 
285 (2007) (quoting State v. Estes, 11 1 ldaho 423,427-28, 725 P.2d 128, 132-33 
(1986)). The ldaho Supreme Court has further recognized "[tlhe right to due 
process does not guarantee a defendant an error-free trial but a fair one," and 
the function of appellate review is "not to discipline the prosecutor for 
misconduct, but to ensure that any such misconduct did not interfere with the 
defendant's right to a fair trial." State v. Revnolds, 120 ldaho 445, 451, 816 P.2d 
1002, 1008 (Ct. App. 1991). 
C. Fundamental Error 
Absent a timely objection at trial, an appellate court will generally not 
consider an issue on appeal unless the error alleged is "fundamental error." 
State v. McAway, 127 ldaho 54, 896 P.2d 962 (1995). An error is fundamental if 
it "goes to the foundation or basis of a defendant's rights or must go to the 
foundation of the case or take from the defendant a right which was essential to 
his defense and which no court could or ought to permit him to waive." State v. 
Christiansen, 144 ldaho 463, 470, 163 P.3d 1175, 1182 (2007). An error is not 
deemed fundamental and may not be reviewed for the first time on appeal if it 
could have been cured by a timely objection. State v. Brown, $31 ldaho 61, 68- 
71, 951 P.2d 1288, 1295-98 (Ct. App. 1998). In the context of closing 
arguments, the ldaho Supreme Court has stated: 
Prosecutorial misconduct rises to the level of fundamental error if it 
is calculated to inflame the minds of jurors and arouse passion or 
prejudice against the defendant, or is so inflammatory that the 
jurors may be influenced to determine guilt on factors outside the 
evidence. More specifically, prosecutorial misconduct during 
closing arguments will constitute fundamental error only if the 
comments were so egregious or inflammatory that any consequent 
prejudice could not have been remedied by a ruling from the trial 
court informing the jury that the comments should be disregarded. 
State v. Sheahan, 139 ldaho 267, 280, 77 P.3d 956, 969 (2003) (citations, 
quotations, and brackets omitted). 
The same standard of fundamental error is applied to claims of 
prosecutorial misconduct during opening statements. State v. Dunn, 134 ldaho 
165, 171, 997 P.2d 626, 632 (Ct. App. 2000); State v. Priest, 128 ldaho 6, 13, 
909 P.2d 624,631 (Ct. App. 1995). 
Application of the foregoing standards to Troutman's claims of 
prosecutorial misconduct reveals he has failed to establish error, much less 
fundamental error, 
D. None Of The Prosecutor's Statements Troutman Complains Of Were 
Improper. Much Less So E~renious Or Inflammatow That Anv 
Consequent Preiudice Could Not Have Been Cured Bv A Curative 
Instruction 
Troutman claims the prosecutor engaged in "numerous instances of 
misconduct during her opening statements and closing arguments" that "are so 
egregious as to constituted [sic] fundamental, reversible error." (Appellant's 
Brief, p.8.) All of Troutman's misconduct claims lack merit. 
1. The Prosecutor Did Not Ask The Jurv To Draw Inferences She 
Knew To Be False Nor Did She Araue Inconsistent Theories 
In discussing the state's burden of proof and the evidence presented at 
trial of the multiple unauthorized entries into Heather's room, the prosecutor 
advised the jury that her burden to establish the elements of rape did not require 
her to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, what happened during each of those 
different entries, explaining: 
I only have to prove to you one time, and we know that that 
one time did take place. There is a period of time between the time 
he enters the room until that room is entered again. 
Defendant tells us that he passed the key to another man, 
because he figured it's just a matter of figuring that this woman in 
there that he doesn't know and has never met before and has 
never talked to is up to having sex with multiple members of the 
football team. 
He also tells us that he went to his own room -- Leo told us 
that. He came to the room and talked about getting a camera from 
a girl. Leo didn't talk about a time frame, but it would have to 
logically be after the time he has entered the room, has taken her 
camera and left again. 
And you know that it's her camera by the way that he is 
talking about it, because he ends up returning it when the jig is up, 
and the police are on the scene, and they are investigating. 
He panics and is trying to return everything and get all the 
evidence and the camera from himself. So the camera, he talks 
about he told the police about, has to be the same camera. I don't 
have to prove it beyond a reasonable doubt, but it's a pretty good 
probability. 
At 4:53 a.m. we know that room has been entered a second 
time. I don't have to prove if there was a rape or theft there, 
because the victim is unconscious. She is unaware these multiple 
entries are happening. She doesn't know who is coming into the 
room, to tell us again at 5:09 a.m., 16 minutes later, the room is 
entered again. 
The same key card the defendant had in his possession. 
That key card never went back to Jessi and was never placed back 
into the room, so he had it, and he says he handed it off to a third 
party unknown to the victim. Okay? 
So either he or someone that he designated, by passing it 
along, is going into that room again. And that happens, a second 
entry happens. Again, don't know if there is rape or theft 
happening again. 
0 2 9 ~ ~ ' ~ ~  again is used one hour later. There is a fourth 
entry. Again, do not know what other crimes were committed 
against this woman during that time frame. We do know at some 
point the iPOD was taken from the room. Her other luggage was 
searched. The wires that go with it are taken out of the room as 
well, and again, I don't know -- that's a side issue. I don't know if 
Mr. Troutman did that beyond a reasonable doubt or if his buddy 
that he passed the card to did that, but I do know that Mr. Troutman 
returned it all to the front desk when he knew the police was [sic] on 
them, and he would be getting caught. 
All of that, mere inability to know who's in there, how many 
times he is coming in, she is not aroused. She is not awakened. 
She does not know, and she does not even realize a theft has 
happened, because she is that unaware and sedated and 
unconscious and helpless.5 
And their repetitive entering into the room obviously speaks 
squarely to the point of her ability to be able to appreciate the 
nature of the act, which is the penetration in this case. 
(Trial Tr., p.641, L.3 - p.643, L.lO.) 
Setting aside the clear import of the prosecutor's argument that evidence 
of multiple entries into Heather's room by Troutman and Reynolds of which she 
029CD refers the code assigned to the room key used to enter Heather's room. 
(Exhibit 28; Trial Tr., pp.425-430.) 
Troutman omits this paragraph of the prosecutor's closing argument from his 
excerpt, without indication of the omission. (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) 
was unaware indicated her inability to consent, Troutrnan argues that the 
prosecutor engaged in misconduct by making this argument because, he 
complains, the argument "implied" that (1) Troutman "must have known that 
[Heather] was incapacitated because he may have snuck back into her hotel 
room one or more times after having sex with her," and (2) Troutman "is simply a 
bad man, a criminal, who may have raped and stolen from [Heather] multiple 
times." (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) According to Troutman, these implications were 
"extremely dishonest" because the prosecutor: 
knew very well that Mr. Reynolds had entered [Heather's] room 
three separate times; she knew that Mr. Troutman certainly could 
not have raped Ms. Schiliereff multiple times; and she knew that 
Mr. Reynolds was the one who had taken the iPod and its charger, 
and had rooted around for additional items to steal. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.10-I I .) 
Troutman supports his argument by referencing testimony from the grand 
jury proceedings by Officer Mark Vucinich regarding Reynolds' admissions. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.9.) Specifically, Officer Vucinich testified that Reynolds 
admitted he went into Heather's room after Troutman gave him the key and told 
him he could go in there and have sex, and admitted he stole Heather's iPod 
"and some miscellaneous fixtures that go with it," and returned to her room two 
more times - once to look for "more items for the iPod," and once for no 
particular reason. (Grand Jury Tr., p.161, L.12 - p.172, L.15.) 
Exactly why Troutman believes the grand jury testimony cited 
demonstrates knowledge on the part of the prosecutor that Troutman never re- 
entered Heather's room is unclear. That Reynolds admitted he made multiple 
entries into Heather's room and stole Heather's iPod and charger is certainly not 
mutually exclusive of the possibility that Troutman also re-entered Heather's 
room with Reynolds at some point. The same grand jury testimony Troutman 
relies on indicates Reynolds saw the camera the first time he went in Heather's 
room but did not take it. (Grand Jury Tr., p.167, Ls.14-21.) Since Troutman 
admitted "grabbing" some stuff, and told Leo Sullivan he got a camera from a 
"girl," it is not beyond reason that Troutman could have returned with Reynolds 
on his third or fourth trip into Heather's room. This possibility is supported by Mr. 
Sullivan's additional testimony that he overheard Reynolds and Troutman in his 
room at some point after Troutman told him he had gotten the camera. (Trail Tr., 
p.226, L.6 - p.227, L.23.) The conversation between Troutman and Reynolds 
also included references to sexual contact with a girl. (Trial Tr., p.227, Ls.21-23.) 
It would be not be unreasonable to infer from this information that Troutman and 
Reynolds may have gotten back together after Troutman gave the key to 
Reynolds and before going back to Reynolds' and Sullivan's room, and Troutman 
has cited nothing in the record to establish that the prosecutor knew this was 
false. 
Troutman's reliance on Nguyen V. Lindsey, 232 F.3d 1236 (gth Cir. 2000), 
Thompson v. Calderon, 120 F.3d 1045, 1058 (gth Cir. 1997), reversed on other 
grounds, and State v. Pearce, 146 Idaho 241, 248-49, 192 P.3d 1065, 1072-73 
(2008), to support his claim of misconduct is misplaced. In Thompson, the Ninth 
Circuit held '?hat when no new significant evidence comes to light a prosecutor 
cannot, in order to convict two defendants at separate trials, offer inconsistent 
theories and facts regarding the same crime." 120 F.3d at 1058 (emphasis 
added). Similarly, in Nauven, the Ninth Circuit held "that a prosecutor's pursuit of 
fundamentally inconsistent theories in separate trials against separate 
defendants charged with the same murder can violate due process if the 
prosecutor knowingly uses false evidence or acts in bad faith." 232 F.3d at 1240 
(emphasis added). However, the court in Nsuyen also noted that a mere 
difference in the evidence presented at separate trials involving co-defendants is 
not sufficient to establish a due process violation, particularly where there is no 
evidence of falsification or bad faith, and the theories presented in each case are 
consistent. id. 
In Pearce, the ldaho Supreme Court, after discussing Thompson and 
Nguven, stated: 
While a prosecutor, as the agent of the people and the state, 
has the unique duty to ensure a fundamentally fair trial by seeking 
not only to convict, but also to vindicate the truth and to administer 
justice, courts have largely recognized the limits of punishing 
prosecutors for apparent inconsistencies in their approach to 
criminal trials absent a "core" inconsistency. 
146 Idaho at -, 192 P.3d at 1073 (citations omitted). 
There is absolutely no evidence that the prosecutor in this case pursued 
inconsistent theories against Troutman and Reynolds at separate trials involving 
the same crime. Indeed, the state did not charge Troutman and Reynolds with 
the same offense (R., pp.10-12), and Reynolds never went to trial (Appendix A - 
Register of Actions from State v. Reynolds). Therefore, the principles articulated 
in Thompson, Nguven, and Pearce do not apply. 
Even if this Court were to apply the principles articulated in Thompson, 
Nquven, and Pearce to differences in the evidence presented at the grand jury 
and the evidence presented at trial, ignoring the Ninth Circuit's acknowledgement 
in Nguven that "trial preparation is not a static process," 232 F.3d at 1240, and 
ignoring that Troutman and Reynolds were not even charged with the same 
crime, Troutman has failed to establish an insonsistency in the "theory" 
presented to the grand jury and the "theory" presented at Troutman's trial simply 
because the prosecutor, in her closing argument, did not advise the jury that 
there was evidence that Reynolds admitted stealing the iPod. Indeed, the 
prosecutor could not have done so because Reynolds' admissions were not 
introduced at Troutman's trial, and the prosecutor did not act in bad faith by 
failing to introduce such evidence, particularly since, as the prosecutor pointed 
out, who stole what and when was ultimately irrelevant to whether Troutman 
raped Heather. 
Setting aside Troutman's reliance on the grand jury testimony regarding 
Reynolds' involvement in the thefts and his erroneous assertion that the state's 
position before the grand jury was inconsistent with its theory at trial, Troutman's 
belief that the prosecutor's comments "implied" Troutman is "simply a bad man," 
does not make them improper. Presumably most closing arguments following a 
rape trial could be read to imply the defendant is a bad man - that does not 
mean such arguments are misconduct. To the extent Troutman is arguing that 
the prosecutor's comments were improper because they urged the jury to convict 
him, not on the evidence, but because he was a bad man generally, such an 
argument is clearly belied by the record. As previously noted, the prosecutor's 
comments regarding the multiple entries into Heather's room were made in the 
context of discussing the state's burden of proof and what the burden applied to, 
and not for the purpose of implying Troutman was a "bad man." 
Troutman's argument that the prosecutor's comments may have also 
implied that Troutman "must have known that [Heather] was incapacitated 
because he may have snuck back into her hotel room one or more times after 
having sex with her," misstates the prosecutor's argument. The evidence 
presented at trial established that there were multiple entries into Heather's room 
without her knowledge. It was perfectly acceptable for the prosecutor to highlight 
this information in closing argument, as she did, and argue that evidence of 
multiple entries unknown to Heather demonstrated that Heather was 
unconscious of what was going on or was incapable of consenting to or resisting 
sexual intercourse. 
Troutman's argument that the prosecutor committed misconduct by 
discussing the multiple entries into Heather's room, her references to the items 
taken, including the iPod, and her statement that she was unsure what, if any, 
other crimes may have occurred during those multiple unauthorized entries was 
a violation of I.R.E. 404(b), is equally unmeritorious. Evidence of the four entries, 
the items that were stolen, and the DNA evidence were all introduced at trial 
without objection. To suggest, as Troutman does, that the prosecutor could not 
discuss this evidence in closing argument and the reasonable inferences to be 
drawn therefrom or discuss this evidence in relation to the state's burden of proof 
is contrary to law. See State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 280, 77 P.3d 956, 969 
(2003) (the parties "are entitled to discuss fully, from their respective standpoints, 
the evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom") (citation omitted) 
2. The Prosecutor Did Not Distort Troutman's Defense 
Troutman's closing argument centered around the theory that Troutman 
had sex with Heather with her consent, and the jury could conclude she 
consented because she told Eric she was not sure if it was consensual and 
because prior to taking her Ambien and going to sleep she was "behaving in a 
way that is appearing normal to other people, and yet she doesn't remember it," 
and sending text messages, which, the defense argued requires "coordination" 
and "fine motor control." (See senerallv Trial Tr., pp.657-663.) The defense 
further argued that because Heather does not know whether the sex was 
consensual, nobody knows. (Trial Tr., p.663, L.18 - p.664, L.19.) In addition, 
the defense characterized the "camera" as a "red herring," arguing, "There is no 
excuse for stealing a camera. I'm not going to pretend there is. But this isn't a 
theft case. This is a rape case. And stealing a camera does not get you to 
rape." (Trial Tr., p.663, Ls.9-13.) 
In rebuttal, the state argued, infer alia: 
[H]e would have a done deal if, based on this argument, we are all 
going to have to put heavy locks on our doors, on the windows in 
our house and wear chastity belts when we go to bed, because in 
case you are lawfully ingesting any substance that makes you 
unable to fend for yourself and the next day you can't remember 
much about what's happened, but the law enforcement has done 
their absolute best and has figured out the criminal involved and the 
crime that's committed, you are at fault, and there is no crime. 
Under this suggestion, if your house door is unlocked and a 
person walking by decides that they are going to check all the 
doors in the neighborhood in the middle of the night and see who's 
got something they can take, comes into your house, and you 
happen to have taken a sleeping pill, or whatever, or are just a 
really heavy sleeper and someone comes through your house, 
takes everything you have and goes, "Hey, buddy, I'm taking your 
car," and you don't wake up, and he leaves. 
When he is caught later, he is going to go, "I was in his 
house. It was unlocked. He didn't tell me I couldn't come in." 
And then I said to him "Dude, I'm taking your car, and he 
doesn't remember, and he did not follow the warnings on the 
Ambien he was taking that said don't mix it with alcohol, that's his 
fault." 
When you start shifting the blame in a case like this onto the 
victim for her inability to remember every detail of what she was 
doing behind her locked door, in her own bedroom, in her own bed, 
then you are turning the world upside down. Justice not in its real 
sense, but what conceptual sense is. 
(Trial Tr., p.665, L.3 - p.666, L.15.) 
On appeal, Troutman complains the foregoing argument made by the 
prosecutor during rebuttal "grossly misstated and distorted what Mr. Troutman's 
defense actually was," "exhorted the jurors to convict Mr. Troutman based on a 
desire to cure a greater societal problem andlor protect themselves from others," 
and sought to reduce the state's burden of proof. (Appellant's Brief, p.16.) All of 
Troutman's claims fail 
First, Troutman's argument that the prosecutor characterized his "defense 
as being one of 'I didn't hear her say 'no,' so I took that as a 'yes"' (Appellant's 
Brief., p.6), is false. Nowhere in the argument cited by Troutman, and excerpted 
above, did the prosecutor characterize the defense in this manner. Nor did the 
prosecutor's use of the word "blame" improperly characterize Troutman's 
defense. Rather, the prosecutor simply urged the jury to reject Troutman's 
argument that the jury could not find him guilty because Heather could not 
remember whether the sex was consensual. This was not improper. 
Second, contrary to Troutman's argument, the prosecutor did not "ask[ ] 
the jury to convict Mr. Troutman to alleviate societal problems that are much 
larger than Mr. Troutman's own case, and out of fear for themselves, their 
families, and, in fact, anyone else who might become a victim of a home 
invasion." (Appellant's Brief, pp.18-19.) The prosecutor was not, as Troutman 
suggests, urging the jury to convict Troutman to "alleviate" a "societal problem[]"6 
- she was using an analogy in response to describe the practical effect of the 
defense's theory of the case. This is not improper. 
Third, Troutman's argument that the state "subtly sought to relax the 
State's burden of proof' is absurd. (Appellant's Brief, p.19.) According to 
Troutman, the state accomplished this "subtle" relaxation of its burden "by 
arguing that, just because the State's key witness could not testify as to whether 
a crime had committed [sic] and, if so, by whom, the jury should nevertheless 
convict Mr. Troutman because 'the law enforcement has done their absolute best 
and has figured out the criminal involved and the crime that's committed."' 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.19-20 (quoting Trial Tr., p.665, Ls.3-14)) This comment 
was not, as Troutman argues, a request for the jury to presume guilt "based on 
the mere fact that Mr. Troutman was believed to be guilty by the police" 
Indeed, the state is unaware of what "societal problem" Troutman thinks the 
prosecutor was trying to alleviate. As far as the state knows, people taking 
Ambien, with or without alcohol, are not regularly the victims of home invasions. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.20), it was an assertion that the jury was not required to 
acquit Troutman simply because Heather could not "remember much about 
what[] happened" (Trial Tr., p.665, L.lO). Troutman's efforts to spin it as anything 
other than that do not withstand scrutiny. 
3. The Prosecutor Did Not lmwroperlv "Attemptll To Engender 
Svmpathv" For Heather "And/or Derision" For Troutman 
Troutman complains "the prosecutor's arguments in this case were replete 
with attempts to engender sympathy for [Heather]." (Appellant's Brief, p.20.) 
Specifically, Troutman argues it was improper for the prosecutor, in her opening 
statement, to "highlight" Heather's "suffering during the rape exam," and in 
closing arguments to refer to Heather as a "poor woman" and a "real person" who 
came to Boise to have a "very nice time" and instead had a "very traumatic 
situation happen to her." (Appellant's Brief, pp.20-21.) These characterizations 
of Heather and her experience hardly constitute misconduct, particularly where, 
as here, they were not the focus of the state's opening statement or closing 
argument, and were not the basis upon which the prosecutor urged the jury to 
convict Troutman. Even if it was improper to refer to Heather as a "real person" 
or "poor woman," or to refer to her "suffering" through the sexual assault exam, 
given that Heather testified about her experience of being sexually assaulted and 
having to undergo what was certainly an unpleasant examination, which included 
pictures, take "medication pills for STDs and pregnancy," and AIDS testing (Trial 
Tr., p.97, Ls.16-23), it is unlikely the prosecutor's characterizations of Heather 
and her experience further influenced the jury to convict Troutman. See State v. 
m, 122 ldaho 809, 819, 839 P.2d 1223, 1233 (Ct. App. 1992) (concluding that 
although it was improper for the prosecutor to ask the victim of rape what had 
"been the hardest part of the whole thing" for her, because the victim "had just 
testified she had been abducted, choked, beaten, raped, and threatened with the 
loss of her life and the lives of her children," the court did "not see how a 
subsequent question implying that these events had been 'hard' for her could 
further influence the jury"). 
Troutman's claim that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by trying "to 
generate resentment" toward him by noting he did not wear a condom also lacks 
merit. (Appellant's Brief, pp.21-22.) Troutman, by his own admission, and as 
evidenced by the DNA analysis, did not wear a condom. (Trial Tr., p.459, Ls.19- 
24, p.512, Ls.9-17.) As a result, Heather testified she had to take "medication 
pills for STDs and pregnancy," and AIDS testing. (Trial Tr., p.97, Ls.16-23.) It 
was not improper for the prosecutor to refer to this evidence during closing 
argument. See Sheahan, 139 ldaho at 280, 77 P.3d at 969 (the parties "are 
entitled to discuss fully, from their respective standpoints, the evidence and the 
inferences to be drawn therefrom") (citation omitted). It was evidence of 
Troutman's conduct that made him look like a "bad man," not the prosecutor's 
argument. 
4. The Prosecutor Did Not Testify 
Troutman claims the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by stating, in 
response to Troutman's statement to Detective Brechwald that he thought 
Heather was just one of those girls who likes to have sex with multiple football 
players, "Even women who -- and I am yet to hear from a single woman who has 
done that - this is anecdotal from him --that there are women who have sex with 
multiple members at one time, willingly have sex with multiple members at one 
time . . .." (Appellant's Brief, p.23 (quoting Trial Tr., p.652, Ls.2-7.) According to 
Troutman, such argument was improper because it amounted to testimony by the 
prosecutor regarding "new evidence . . . that she has never personally heard of a 
woman wanting to have sex with multiple partners." (Appellant's Brief, p.23.) 
This is an overbroad characterization of the prosecutor's statement. She did not 
say she had never, in her own personal experience, heard of a woman engaging 
in such behavior. She said that she had "yet to hear from a single woman who 
has done that" - a comment that could very well be referring to the evidence 
introduced at trial, or the lack thereof. 
Even if the prosecutor's statement could be characterized as improper 
"testimony" regarding facts not in evidence, Troutman has failed to explain why 
the statement was so egregious or inflammatory that it could not have been 
cured by an objection such that the statement must be deemed fundamental 
error. 
5. The Prosecutor Did Not Ask The Juw To Presume Rape "In An 
Effort To Chanae Existins 'Lenient' Cultural Views Reaardina Sex" 
Troutman's final claim of prosecutorial misconduct is based on the 
following argument: 
He wants to finagle his way around the sexual issues. And I 
don't know what it is about our culture, generally not American, but 
all male-female relationships, where we give more importance to 
someone taking a tangible thing from us without our permission, but 
we are more lenient about the issue of someone having sexual 
penetration. 
Maybe he could have been misled or misunderstood. We 
don't say maybe he misunderstood that he could take a camera. 
He didn't ask her about taking that, either. 
We are very clear on that issue, that you took the camera, 
didn't ask permission, and that's not okay. But with the sex, we are 
willing to sort of go into the realm of unreasonable, unfortunately. 
(Trial Tr., p.656, Ls.8-24.) 
Troutman argues this was improper argument because, he claims, "it 
could have been taken one (or both) of two ways:" (1) it could have been viewed 
by the jury as permission to "presume rape from the fact that Mr. Troutman had 
sex with [Heather] without specific permission" just as they could "presume theft 
from the fact that Mr. Troutman took [Heather's] camera without explicit 
permission," andlor (2) the jury should "apply a more pro-prosecution standard to 
their deliberations because cultural views on non-consensual sex have 
traditionally been too lax." (Appellant's Brief, p.25.) Both of Troutman's 
interpretations strain reason. 
Nowhere in her argument did the prosecutor ask the jury to presume 
Troutman raped Heather, much less ask them to presume he did so based on 
the presumption that he stole her camera. This is an absurd reading of the 
prosecutor's argument, as is Troutman's claim that the argument could be 
interpreted as urging the jury to be "more pro-prosecution" to compensate for 
"lax" "cultural views on non-consensual sex." The foregoing argument 
immediately followed a discussion of Troutman's theft of the camera and his 
initial denials that he took the camera: 
The detective asked him in seven different ways [whether he 
took the camera]. Defendant's response is "no" seven different 
times, because they asked him. Of course, [Officer] Vucinich even 
tried to make it sound less accusatory, "Did the camera follow you 
through, out the door," make it sound a little less problematic, so 
they may say, "Oh, yes it may have." 
He can't do it. Why do you think that is? Because that's a 
tangible object. It's one thing to do try [sic] to bamboozle people 
and say, "Oh, she was totally into it. She just can't remember. She 
liked it. She was into it. She was fine. She was awake," because 
that isn't something tangible. 
We cannot see that far into them. We can't open up 
Heather's brain to see what was going on in there. But a camera 
that left the room while a girl was sleeping, that is called taking 
people's things without their permission. 
And he can't admit to that, because it's a very concrete, 
obviously, bad act on his part that he did to this person, to a person 
that he is claiming is awake and is fully aware of what's going on. 
When he is pushed to the brink -- because they are saying, 
"Look, why should I believe you about the rape? Why you can't 
admit to the simple fact that you took this girl's camera without 
permission," he again says, "I was tipsy. I grabbed some stuff. I'm 
not going to see what -- I grabbed some stuff thinking it was mine, 
and as soon as I found it wasn't, I gave it back -- gave it to back to 
the victim." 
Of course, that is not at all the case. He did not think his 
camera was inside her purse. He just does not know how to deny 
the undeniable. 
(Trial Tr., p.654, L.21 - p.656, L.7.) 
If it was not apparent from the portion of the argument cited by Troutman, 
it is certainly apparent when the entire argument is read in context that the 
prosecutor was not urging the jury to presume anything or to be more 
sympathetic to the prosecution based on "cultural norms." Rather, she was 
highlighting that there is no distinction between taking a piece of property without 
someone's permission and taking something more personal and intimate without 
their permission. This is not improper. 
Troutman's additional claims that the prosecutor's argument was improper 
because it "misled the jury" by allegedly implying "that Mr. Troutman had been 
found guilty of theft when, in actuality he had never even been charged with . . . 
such an offense" and "implied that the accidental taking of someone else's 
property constitutes theft under Idaho law" are ridiculous. (Appellant's Brief, 
p.25.) The prosecutor in no way indicated Troutman had been found guilty of 
theft, and her comments that he took the camera were consistent with the 
evidence of Troutman's admission that he did so. 
6. Troutman Has Failed To Establish Anv Error. Much Less 
Fundamental Error 
Troutman "concedes that none of the instances of misconduct complained 
of above were objected to by his attorney at trial," but argues he is nevertheless 
entitled to relief under the fundamental error doctrine. (Appellant's Brief, p.27.) 
Although Troutman cites the correct standard for fundamental error, he fails to 
apply that standard to his claims. (Appellant's Brief, pp.27-28.) Instead, he only 
asserts "that the instances of misconduct described . . . above, whether 
considered individually, or in the aggregate, constitute fundamental error 
because so much of it was calculated inflame [sic] the passions and prejudices of 
the jury and influence the verdict with matters outside the evidence." (Appellant's 
Brief, p.28.) However, the fundamental error standard requires Troutman to 
explain why the comments complained of were so egregious or inflammatory that 
they could not have been cured by an instruction. Sheahan, 139 ldaho at 280, 
77 P.3d at 969. Because Troutman has failed to present any argument on this 
point, this Court should decline to consider his arguments. State v. Zichko, 129 
ldaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) ("A party waives an issue cited on 
appeal if either authority or argument is lacking, not just if both are lacking."). 
Even if this Court considers Troutman's claim of furidamental error, 
because he has failed to establish any error, he has necessarily failed to 
establish fundamental error. Even if some of the prosecutor's arguments were 
improper, Troutman has failed to articulate any basis for concluding the 
arguments were so egregious or inflammatory that "any consequent prejudice 
could not have been remedied by a ruling from the trial court informing the jury 
that the comments should be disregarded." Sheahan, 139 ldaho at 280, 77 P.3d 
at 969. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respeclfully requests that this Court affirm Troutman's 
conviction. 
DATED this 5th day of February, 2009. 
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03/17/2008 Finger Print Card# Sent to BCI - 0100099983 
04/08/2008 Notice of Change of Firm Name and Contact Info 
05/28/2008 Motion to Reconsider Sentence Pursuant to ICR 35 
05/30/2008 State's Objection to Defend's Motion 35 
08/15/2008 Hearing Scheduled (Rider Review 09/08/2008 09:30 AM) 
08/15/2008 STATUS CHANGED: Closed pending clerk action 
08/15/2008 Order to Transport (9/8/08) 
Hearing result for Rider Review held on 09/08/2008 09:30 AM: District Court 
09/08/2008 Hearing Held Court Reporter: Susan Gambee Number of Transcript Pages for this 
hearing estimated: 50 
Probation Ordered (118-1401 Burglary) Probation term: 5 years. (Felony Probation 09/08/2008 Parole) 
09/08/2008 Amended Judgmentsentence modified on 9/8/2008. (118-1401 Burglary) 
09/08/2008 Sentenced To Pay Fine 100.50 charge: 118-1401 Burglary 
09/08/2008 Standard Terms of Probation, CSC, Thinking Errors 
09/09/2008 Order Suspending Sentence and Order of Probation 
I 
I State of Idaho vs. Rennard A Reynolds 
1 No hearings scheduled 
I ~ i c h a r d  
CR-MD-2007-0009022 Magistrate Judge: Schmidt lCase: Old Case: M0709022 Amount$O.OO d e: Closed 
Violation Charge i~harges:  Dat e Citation Disposition 
[ 07/08/2007 118-1401 Burglary 
L 
I Arresting Officer: uBCPD,, BO 
Finding: Defendant Bound 
Over 
Idaho Repository - Case History Page 
Disposition 
date: 0712512007 
Fineslfees: $0.00 1 
I Register 
j of Date 
j actions: 
1 07/10/2007 Case Created 
I 07/10/2007 Case Opened 07/10/2007 Video Arraignment - 07/10/2007 
I 07/10/2007 Charge number I :  Charge Booked by ACSO 07/10/2007 Video Arraignment - Video Arraignment - 07/10/2007 1 07/10/2007 Charge number I: Charge Filed Cause Found 
i 
i 
07/10/2007 Video Arraignment 
i 07/10/2007 Order Appointing Public Defender I 07/10/2007 Charge number 1: Bond Reduced or Amended to - $150000.00 
1 07/10/2007 Event Scheduled - Preliminary Hearing - 07/31/2007 
i 07/12/2007 Notice - of Hearing 
I 07/12/2007 Motion -for Bond Reduction 1 07/12/2007 Defendant Request For Discovery 07/25/2007 Charge number 1: Defendant Bound Over - H0700971 0.02 
07/25/2007 Charge number 1: Count Indicted To - H0700971 D.02 C.002 
07/25/2007 Charge number 1: Bond Transferred To - H0700971 D.02 C.002 
i 07/25/2007 INDICTMENT FILED 
I 
I 07/25/2007 Ref H0700971 and GO700069 
Connection: Secure 
